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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JOANN L. BAILEY, a widow and
TODD F. BAILEY minor son of
FRANK DEE BAILEY, deceased,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

10148

UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION and UTAH
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiffs have appealed from the Order of
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying the
Plaintiffs' application for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah. The
Order of the Commission found that the deceased
doing business as Frank's American Oil Station was
insured by a policy issued by the State Insurance
Fund as a self-employed individual within the mean-

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
ing of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State
of Utah. The Order of the Commission did deny
that the deceased was in the course of his employment at the time the fatal accident occurred.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission held that deceased
was on his way to work at the time the fatal accident occurred and was not acting within the course
of his employment as a self-insured owner and operator of his business.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants submit that the decision of the
Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Frank Dee Bailey, the deceased, was the owner
and operator of a service station named Frank's
American Oil Station, which was situated on State
Street in Lehi, Utah, State Street being U. S. Highway 91 (R-15). He resided at 660 North 3rd West,
American Fork, Utah (R-23 and 45). Mr. Bailey always opened the station. He left his home ordinarily
between 5:00 and 5:30a.m. and went directly to the
station (R-16). His usual hours at the station were
from 6 :00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Being the proprietor
he apparently went back and forth as occasion demanded. (R-19).
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A fatal accident occurred involving Frank Dee
Bailey on September 23, 1963, some seven-tenths
of a mile south of Frank's American Oil Station.
The accident occurred at 5:45 a.m. on U. S. Highway 91, as the deceased was traveling from his home
in American Fork towards his service station located in Lehi, at which time deceased, driving a 1959
Pontiac station wagon, hit the first concrete pillar
on the overhead bridge on Interstate 15, which was
then under construction ( R-45-46) . The record is
clPar that he was not on any special mission, but
was, at the time, going to work.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ONE TRAVELING TO AND FROM HIS
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT IS NOT COVERED
UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIAL MISSION FOR HIS EMPLOYER.
The service station operated by the deceased,
Frank Dee Bailey, was situated in the town of Lehi,
Utah, whereas his residence was at 660 North 3rd
\rest, American Fork, Utah. The evidence is clear
that the deceased, at the time he met with his fatal
accident, was on his way from his home in American
Fork, Utah to his station in Lehi, Utah. The Plaintiffs, herein, at the time of the hearing, made no
effort to show that the deceased was on some special
mission on behalf of his business. It appears clear
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that he was on a direct route from his home to his
place of business at the time of the accident. The
accident occurred on U. S. Highway 91, between
American Fork and Lehi, Utah (R 45).
It has consistently been held by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, that as a general rule
employment does not begin until the employee has
reached the premises where the work is to be done;
that normally coming and going to work is not within the course of employment in the absence of a
special mission.
This rule has been held by our Supreme Court
to apply to an automobile salesman who was driving
home in his own car after a day's work when he was
injured in an accident. The Court held that the accident did not occur in the course of the salesman's
employment. Covey-Ballard Motor Company vs. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 1, 227 P. 1028.
In Wilson vs. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah
46, 207 P. 2d. 1116, it was held that the injuries
sustained by an automobile shop foreman as a result of an automobile accident while enroute to his
regular place of employment in Magna, did not arise
out of or in the course of his employment merely
because on the evening prior to the accident the
employer had instructed the foreman to complete
repairs on an automobile and take it to Salt Lake
City, since the employer's instructions did not send
the foreman upon a special errand, but merely outlined what would be expected of him in performing
his duties the next day.
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At page 207 P. 2d. 1118 the Court said:
Even though decedent was foreman at
any one or all of Wilson's shops, unless the
contract of employment contemplated the employer-employee relationship would commence
when deceased left his home, it would be necessary for the status to be created by some
special mission enroute to work before deceased would be within the protection of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. In view of the
fact that during all of the time decedent had
been on Wilson's regular pay roll as foreman,
his work had been at the Magna shop, unless
the trip on the morning of the accident was
different from that on previous mornings and
in the nature of a special mission, deceased's
employment commenced at the time he arrived
at that shop and not at the time he left his
home in Salt Lake City. It, therefore, follows
that if the instructions Wilson gave the decedent on the evening preceding the day of the
accident merely outlined the duties deceased
was expected to perform after he arrived at
the Magna shop, then the employer-employee
relationship would not come into existence
until the deceased's arrival at the latter place.
In Vitagraph, Inc. vs. Industrial Commission,
85 P. 2d. 601, 96 Utah 190, at 603 P. 2d., the Court
said:
It seems definitely settled that if a workman is injured in the normal course of things,
in going to or from his work or place of employment, that is the result of general hazards
which all must meet and assume and is not
in the course of his employment. Denver &
Rio Grande Western R. Co. vs. Industrial
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Commission, 72 U. 199, 269 P. 512, 62 ALR
1436; Fidelity & Casualty Co. vs. Industrial
Commission, 79 U. 189, 8 P. 2d. 617; Greer
vs. Industrial Commission, 74 U. 379, 279 P.
900. Such is what may be called the plant rule
where the employee does not attach himself
to his employment until he arrives at the
plant or locus of his work, and he is not in
the employment after he leaves the plant or
situs of his work.
The nature of the hazard involved in the case
now being considered in the deceased traveling to
and from his place of employment is one which is
common to all persons using the highway. Such risk
is not one that is peculiar to the employment of the
deceased.
Plaintiffs raise the point that the deceased had
with him some articles used in his business. This
Court has considered this problem in the past.

In Fidelity & Casualty Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 8 P. 2d. 617, 79 U. 189, the Court had before
it a case in which, at the time of his death, Edwin
J. Shufelt was employed by Walgreen Company and
among the things that he was required to do was
ride a bicycle to make deliveries of Kodak films. His
duties required him to call each morning, except
Sunday, at the Semloh Hotel and pick up film to take
to the plant of his employer. On the morning of his
death he left his home riding the bicycle. The accident occurred about 3 miles from the Semloh Hotel
and about 1% blocks frmn where he resided. He had
with him a bag furnished by Walgreen Company for
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the purpose of carrying the film. The Court said at
619 P. 2cl.:
Under the facts in this case we are unable to perceive of any reason why the general
rule, that an employee on his way to work
is not within the protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, does not apply. The mere
fact that Edwin was required to remain at
the Semloh Hotel only long enough to pick
up films does not justify the conclusion that
he was under the protection of the act when
he was about three miles from the hotel on
his way to work.
In considering the whole problem the Court had
this to say at 618 P. 2d.:
The troublesome question presented by
this record is: Did the injuries which caused
the death of Edwin J. Shufelt arise out of or
in the course of his employment? It is a general rule of law that an injury sustained by
an employee while going to or returning from
his place of work upon his own initiative in
a conveyance of his own choosing and on his
own time is not an injury arising out of or
in the course of his employment and hence an
injury thus sustained is not compensable under Workmen's Compensation Acts. This
court is committed to such doctrine. North
Point Consol. Irr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 61 U. 421, 214 P. 22; Greer v. Industrial
Commission, 74 U. 379, 279 P. 900; Denver
& Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 72 U. 199, 269 P. 512, 62 ALR 1436;
Covey-Ballard Motor Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 64 U. 11,227 P. 1028. There are some
exceptions to the general rule. One of such
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exception is where an injury results because
of a danger or peril incident to the use of a
particular method or means of approach to
the place of work. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 U. 161, 207 P. 148
28 ALR 1394; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Indus~
trial Commission, 68 U. 600, 251 P. 555. It
is clear that this case does not fall within that
exception. Another exception to the general
rule is where an employee while going to or
from work on his own time or that of his employer is engaged, when injured, in some substantial mission for his employer growing out
of his employment. Kahn Bros Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 U. 145, 283 P. 1054.
In the case of Greer v. State Industrial Commission of Utah, 74 Utah 379, 279 P. 900, a carpenter foreman was injured shortly before 8 :00 a.m. as
he was on his way to work, when he was struck by
an automobile as he was crossing over from the
crosswalk to enter an automobile driven by a fellow
workman. At the time of his injury he was carrying
a saw which he had taken home the night before to
sharpen as one of his duties required him to keep
the saws sharpened. The Commission denied compensation, and in affirming the order the Court said
at page 279 P. 901:
Under the facts in the instant case, it is
clear that the deceased was not upon any special mission for his employer at the time of
the accident. There was nothing that he was
doing for his master at the time which exposed
him to the perils of the street. He was merely
going from his home to his place of employment. The fact that he was carrying the saw
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was 1nerely incidental. The employee did not
come within any of the exceptions to the general rule.
The Court in the Greer case went on to say:
In this case the deceased was not injured
while sha;rpening the saw at his home. The
accident did not occur while he was actually
engaged in the performance of a duty for
the employer. The dangers of the street between his home and the stockyards were not
incident to his employment, but were dangers
common to all. (emphasis ours)
Under the facts in the instant case it is clear
that the deceased was not upon any special mission
for his employer or in connection with his employment at the time of the accident. There was nothing
he was doing in connection with the operation of
the service station at the time which exposed him to
the perils of the street. He was merely going from
his home to his place of employment. The accident
did not occur while he was actually engaged in the
performance of a duty related to the operation of
the service station. The dangers of the street between
his home and the service station were not incident
to his employment, but were dangers common to all
as the Court said in the Greer case and the fact that
he was carrying the saw was incidental.
It was incidental in the case now before the
Court that the deceased was wearing his service station attendant's uniform, that he had a brief case in
the vehicle he was driving, that he carried the keys
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to the station and that the automobile was, on occasion used in the service station business.
The author of Workmen's Compensation Law
(Larson) has this to say at Page 251:
The mere fact that the claimant is, while
going to work, also carrying with him some
of the paraphernalia of his employment does
not, in itself, connect the trip into part of the
employment. For example, a teacher, after
setting out on her way to school, remembered
that she needed a kettle to be used in a school
pageant. She went back, got the kettle and
fell while she was on the steps of her home.
Citing Industrial Commission vs. Harshrader,
52 Ohio APP. 76, 3 N.E. 2d 61, the Court held in
that case that even though the claimant was carrying some equipment which might be used at her place
of employment, this did not bring her within the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs (PB 3) states that in
the past the Commission has seen fit to award compensation to those who were employees in the strict
sense for injuries occurring off the actual plant
premises of the employer.
The following cases which are cited therein we
feel should be discussed briefly:
Bountiful Brick Company vs. Industrial Commission, 68 U. 600, 251 P. 555:

In this case the deceased employee was killed
while crossing a railroad track when he was within
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thirty feet of an opening in the employer's fence.
This· entrance to the employer's place of business
was stated by the Court to amount to an invitation
to the employees to use the entrance in order to enter
the place where they worked. The Court in this case
followed the holding in Cudahy Packing Co. vs. Indwdrial Commission, 60 U. 160,207 P. 148, in which
case an Pmployee was struck and killed while neces~arily c1·ossing a railroad track on his way to work,
and just before he reached his employer's premises.
The Court held that the Bountiful Brick case was
within the principle decided in the Cudahy Packing
Co. case. The injury in both cases resulted because
of a danger or peril incident to the approach or entrance to the place of work.

Kahn Bros. vs. Industrial Commission, 75 U.
145, 283 P. 1054 is also cited by Plaintiff's counsel.
In this case the Applicant was struck by an automobile as he was walking northerly across Fifth
South Street on the east side of Main Street. The
Industrial Commission gave an award to the Applicant and the Supreme Court sustained the a ward
and stated that they were of the opinion that the
Applicant was on his way to the post office in the
performance of a special mission for his employer
at the time that he was injured. The Court stated
the rule as follows at 283 P. 1054:
It is a general rule that injuries sustained
while an employee is traveling to and from
his place of employment are not compensable .
.An exception to this rule, however, is where
an employee, either on his employer's or on
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his own time, is upon some substantial mission for the employer growing out of his employment. In such cases the employee is within the provision of the Act. The mission for
the employer must be the major factor in the
journey or movement and not merely incidental thereto.
The Kahn case then clearly is a case where the
employee was on some special mission for his employer. Such is not the case in the instant case now
before this Court, as there is no indication in the
evidence that there was any special mission being
performea at the time of the accident.
New York Casualty Company vs. Wetherell,
193 F. 2d. 881, Fifth Circuit, is also cited by Plaintiffs.

In that case Wetherell was employed on continuous duty at the Schill Plant from Saturday noon
until 7:30 a.m. Monday morning. In accordance with
the terms of his contract he was allowed to go home
each Sunday to eat a hot breakfast and to pick up
his lunch. On September 11, 1949 he was struck by
a railroad train and killed.
The claim was held to be compensable but that
case is easily distinguished from the instant case.
At 193 F. 2d. 881 at Page 882 the Court cited the
Texas statute, which is broader than the Utah statute, as follows:
Injuries sustained in the course of employment * * * shall include all other injuries
of every kind and character having to do with
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and originating in the work, business, trade
or profession of the employer received by an
employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or the business of his
employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.
The Court stated the general rule as follows:
It is the general rule, established by the
weight of authority, that where an inJUry occurs at a time not within a contractual exception, employees may not recover
compensation for injuries received while going to and from the place where they are to
perform labor for the employer.
~reat

The Court reasoned that:
***the danger Wetherell encountered
was peculiar to the long period of uninterrupted duty and the necessity of going home
to secure nourishment.
Such danger was incidental to his long period
of employment, and the trip home was within his
contract of hire.
In Kobe vs. Industrial Accident Commiss'ion,
35 Cal. 2d. 33, 215 P. 2d. 736, certain employees
\vere employed to repair the roof of a county courthouse. The terms of their agreement provided that
they would work nine hours a day and should rflceive
ten hours pay. The extra hour being paid for travel
time. While they were returning from work in an
automobile driven by one of the men, the car was
struck by a locomotive, all of the men being injured,
one fatally. The Court in this case recognized the
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general rule that the injuries sustained by an emh
ployee going to or coming from work are not conlpensable, but pointed out that an employer may
agree, either expressly or impliedly, that the relationship of employer and employee shall continue during
the period of coming and going from work.
The facts in the case now before this Court
are entirely different from the facts in the Wetherell
and the Kobe cases. The deceased was not acting
under any kind of special contractual arrangement
with an employer, but he was merely going from
his home to his place of employment at the time the
accident occurred.
Plaintiffs rely most heavily upon Morgan vs.
Industrial Commission, 92 U. 129, 66 P. 2d. 144.
We submit that this case is not helpful to the Plaintiffs inasmuch as the Plaintiff in the Morgan case
was found by the Supreme Court to be on a special
mission for his employer at the time the accident
occurred. The Court said in the majority opinion at
66 P. 2d. 145:
After reaching the building he could not
proceed further with his task because the
office key had been left home. If he had not
left the key at home he would have completed
his work before returning home for lunch.
His return home was for the purpose of getting the key, not the purpose of eating lunch
or entertaining visitors. After reaching home,
however, his errand on behalf of the purpose
for which he left the school building was interrupted. The continuity of the trip was
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broken by the eating of lunch, entertaining of
visitors, and doing the other things mentioned. He resumed his errand, however, when
he finally left home with all the keys in his
possession intending to go to the schoolhouse
and finish the work that night. Under the
holding of this Court in the case of Sullivan
v. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 317, 10 P. 2d.
924, Plaintiff would not have been in the
master's business in doing any of the personal
things at his home but would again attach
himself to the master's mission or errand
when he left home to travel toward the school.
This, of course, on the assumption that the
errand home was a substantial one for and
in the interest of the employer. The fact that
there was a break in the continuity of the
errand does not change its purpose if, after
Plaintiff stepped aside to do personal acts, he
again resumed the errand. There is an entire
absence of anything in the evidence from
which it could be inferred that Plaintiff made
the trip from the school to his home or again
from hw home to the school, for any personal
reason or purpose. (emphasis ours)
And again at 66 P. 2d. 145 at Page 146:
We conclude therefore that Plaintiff was
on an errand in the business of the master
when he left the school building for the purpose of procuring his key which he had previously left home, and on his return from
home to the school building. The fact that the
journey was interrupted does not change the
purpose of the errand. (emphasis ours)
Deceased in this case now before the Court
was on his ·way to work and was not on a special
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mission in the performance of the operation of the
service station.

POINT II
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-43,
U.C.A. AS AMENDED DO NOT BRING DECEASED WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
This section above mentioned provides in part
as follows:
The words employee ... as used in this
title, shall be construed to mean:
( 4) If the employer is a partnership, or
sole proprietorship, such employer may elect
to include as an "employee" within the provisions of this act, any member of such partnership, or the owner of the sole proprietorship, devoting full time to the partnership
or proprietorship business.
It appears that Plaintiffs' counsel believes that
this section, particularly the words devoting full
time means something different than what is usually
meant by such term and that by reason thereof the
deceased was covered from the time he left his home.
The ordinary understanding of the words devoting
full-time means to include those who are working
at a normal full-time occupation rather than one
working on a part-time basis. Certainly it cannot
be construed to mean that this statute was intended
by the Legislature to mean that because an indi-
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vidual etuployer elects to come under the Workmen's
Compensation Act that he is covered all the time.
Can it reasonably be argued that he is covered for
a greater period of time or under circumstances
other than for which his employees are covered? This
would be stretching the words of the statute far
beyond their natural and usual meaning. It would
be an extension of the coverage contemplated by the
Workmen's Compensation Act as it had been interpreted by this Court.
It is the Defendants' contention that the above
mentioned statute as amended does not extend to an
employer or sole proprietor or a partner any benefits over and beyond those benefits which have over
the years been afforded to employees covered under
the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state.
It is asked in Plaintiffs' Brief (P.B.5) :

Would not a Judge be covered while driving to the Court house? Or would not the
Commissioner be covered while traveling to
an Industrial Commission hearing in some
distant city?
These propositions are not the same. Certainly
a judge would not be covered if he met with an
accident while on his way to where he regularly held
court, but if he was injured while traveling to some
other place to hold court he would be covered. The
same is true of the Commissioner he would not be
covered while journeying to the State Capitol Building where he regularly holds hearings, but he would
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be covered while he traveled to some other part of
the state to engage in the business of the Industrial
Commission.
The concept presented by Plaintiffs' Brief
would make the coverage afforded to an individual
proprietor the same as that afforded under an accident policy. We have no quarrel with the proposition
that an individual employer may come and go as
he pleases and that he will be covered when he is
at his place of employment, or on a special mission,
but we do contend that he is not covered while he
is traveling to and from his home, with no special
mission intervening.

POINT III
THE COMMISSION WAS NOT ARB 1TRARY.
Plaintiffs, in their brief, state that the Commission disallowed the introduction in evidence of
the briefcase together with the records contained
therein, and that this action was arbitrary, and
harmful to Plaintiffs. We cannot see how the Plaintiffs were in any way damaged or prejudiced in presenting their case inasmuch as the record (R-17)
contains the testimony of the witness, Mrs. JoAnn
L. Bailey, that the deceased had his briefcase in the
automobile at the time of the accident, and that the
briefcase contained certain records which pertained
to the station (R-18). No useful purpose would have
been served to have had the briefcase itself in evi-
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dence. The Commission was fully informed as to
the presence of the briefcase and papers.
Plaintiffs object also to the ruling of the referee
that the witness could not testify as to the habits of
the deceased on previous occasions ( R-27) . Defendants' counsel took the position that what was before
the Commission was what occurred on the morning
of the fatal accident. The evidence was clear that
deceased was on the direct route from his home to
his station at the time his motor vehicle collided with
the concrete pillar on the overhead bridge on Interstate 15, then under construction (R 45, 46). There
was no reason to speculate that deceased was doing
other than driving from his home to his work.
We believe that the Plaintiffs were not in any
way precluded from presenting their case.
The Industrial Commission's Order (R-56)
finds as follows :
No evidence was presented by Applicants
to prove that deceased was in the course of
his employment as a self-insured owner and
operator of his business. In fact, the evidence
is undisputed and conclusive in our opinion
that the deceased was going to work when he
was fatally injured and not on a special mission.
The Industrial Commission has the duty to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law and
will not be disturbed unless the Commission arbitt·arily and capriciously disregards the evidence.
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In the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines
Company vs. The Industrial Commission, 84 Utah
481, 36 P. 2d. 979, the Court said in part at 36 P. 2d.
982:
***in the determining of facts the conclusions of the Commission are like a verdict
of a jury, and will not be interfered with by
this Court when supported by some substantial evidence.
In a recent case, Burton vs. Industrial Commission, 13, Utah 2d. 553, 374, P. 2d. 439, this Court
said at 374 P. 2d. 439:
In order to reverse the finding and order
made, the Plaintiff must show that there is
such credible uncontradicted evidence in her
favor that the Commission's refusal to so find
was capricious and arbitrary.
We submit that in view of the evidence submitted, and under the provisions of Section 35-1-85
U.C.A., 1953 and the cases above cited that the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact are conclusive and final and should not be interfered with
by the Court.

CONCLUSION
We submit that the Industrial Commission
properly conducted its proceedings in the matter,
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and from the evidence reached the correct conclusion. The decision and Order of the Commission
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants
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